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CASE NOTES
Bar Admission--DEFAULT ON STUDENT LOAN WARRANTS DENIAL OF
ADMISSION TO MINNESOTA BAR-In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn.
1979).
The Minnesota Supreme Court is authorized to prescribe qualifica-
tions for admission to the Minnesota bar,' and it considers attorney regu-
lation to be within its exclusive judicial domain.2 According to the court,
the opportunity to practice law in Minnesota is not a property right pro-
tected or guaranteed by the state or federal constitutions. 3 Instead, the
practice of law is considered a privilege that can be conferred on specific
individuals by the court4 and is subordinate to the court's greater obliga-
1. See MINN. STAT. § 481.01 (1978) (directing supreme court to adopt rules prescrib-
ing qualifications of all applicants for admission to Minnesota bar and to appoint Board
of Law Examiners to administer rules and examine all applicants).
2. See Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 425, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280 (1973) (power
to regulate practice of law inherently rests with judiciary); In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 490,
189 N.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1971) (per curiam) (formulation of professional conduct stan-
dards is responsibility of judicial branch; court vested with ultimate determination gov-
erning admission, supervision, and discipline of attorneys); In re Integration of Bar, 216
Minn. 195, 198-99, 12 N.W.2d 515, 517-18 (1943) (per curiam) (Minnesota constitution
vests supreme court with exclusive power to make necessary rules and regulations gov-
erning the bar); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 44-47, 266 N.W. 88, 92-93 (per curiam), modifed
per curiam, 197 Minn. 47, 267 N.W. 142 (1936); In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 54, 248
N.W. 735, 737 (1933) (per curiam).
The same position has been taken by the United States Supreme Court. See Exparte
Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1857). The Court in Secombe stated, "[I1t has been well
settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and coun-
sellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." Id at 13.
The Minnesota Legislature also has recognized the courts' power to regulate the legal
profession. See note 1 supra. While the judiciary's right to define and regulate the legal
profession is deemed to be inherent in its power to administer justice, acts of the legislature
in regulating the legal profession are considered as aiding rather than detracting from the
power of the judiciary. Cf In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 46, 266 N.W. 88, 93 (per curiam)
(Minnesota court prefers to comply with legislative will when independence ofjudiciary is
preserved), modifedper curiam, 197 Minn. 47, 267 N.W. 142 (1936).
3. See, e.g., In re Smith,.220 Minn. 197, 199, 19 N.W.2d 324, 325 (1945) ("The right
to practice law is a matter of license and high privilege and is in no sense an absolute right.
It is in the nature of a franchise. ... ); In re Integration of Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 200, 12
N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943) (per curiam) ("The practice of law is not a property right guaran-
teed or protected by either the state or federal constitution."); cf Bradwell v. State, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (admission to practice law not within fourteenth amend-
ment privileges and immunities clause); In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1978)
(no constitutional right to practice law in one's home state), appealdismissed, 441 U.S. 938
(1979).
4. See In re Integration of Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 200, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943) (per
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tion to further the administration of justice and protect constitutional
rights. This privilege, or license, is based upon a threefold requirement
of ability, character, and responsible supervision.5 In the case of In re
Gahan,6 the court clarified its interpretation of the character require-
ment.
The issue before the Gahan court was whether the Board of Law Exam-
iners properly denied an applicant admission to the Minnesota bar. The
court determined that, in view of the facts of the case, 7 the applicant's
curiam) ("The practice of law .... is a privilege conferred on the individual by the court
to further the administration of justice.").
In cases involving bar applicants or lawyers facing disbarment proceedings, courts
have accorded due process rights without clearly defining the practice of law either as a
privilege or as a right. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
The Schware Court stated:
We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a "right" or
"privilege." Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this
occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be pre-
vented from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is
not a matter of the State's grace.
Id at 239 n.5. In Smith v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116
(1908), the court stated:
Whether the right to practice medicine be classed as a property right, strictly
speaking, or as a mere privilege, it is not material; for, whichever name be given
it, it is a valuable right which cannot be taken away without due process of law,
the essential elements of which are notice and opportunity to defend.
Id. at 69, 117 N.W. at 1117.
Although courts may differ as to their use of the term "right" or "privilege" when
discussing the regulation of the legal profession, apparently they are in substantial agree-
ment that procedural due process rights must be accorded to each bar applicant or attor-
ney facing disbarment. See generally Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) ("The practice
of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his
moral character."); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951)
(franchise or privilege); note 3 supra and accompanying text.
5. See Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951)
("[P]ublic welfare is safeguarded not merely by limiting law practice to individuals who
are possessed of the requisite ability and character, but also by the further requirement
that such practitioners shall thenceforth be officers of the court and subject to its supervi-
sion."); cf. Kephart, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 40 DICK. L. REV. 225, 226 (1936) ("No
member of the bar comes to the profession easily. . . . A lawyer must be of good moral
character. He must have the requisite educational qualifications and skill. There are
other obligations that must be met.").
6. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979).
7. The circumstances of the case may be summarized as follows: The applicant was
a graduate of the University of San Francisco Law School. As of the time of his gradua-
tion, the applicant had obtained approximately $14,000 in federally insured student loans.
Subsequent to his admission to the California bar, the applicant was employed by two
California law firms at annual salaries of $15,000 and $18,000, respectively. Between
these jobs, the applicant was unemployed for two months. During this period of unem-
ployment, the applicant filed a petition for voluntary bankruptcy in federal district court.
The applicant was single, had never been married, and had no dependents. Immediately
prior to filing his petition for bankruptcy, the applicant mortgaged his 1959 Jaguar auto-
[Vol. 6
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default on certain federally insured student loans and his subsequent dis-
charge of those loans in a bankruptcy proceeding showed a flagrant dis-
regard for the rights of others. 8 The court held that the applicant's
actions evidenced a lack of good moral character and accordingly af-
firmed the decision of the Board of Law Examiners. 9
The Gahan court's decision focused upon the second basic requirement
for admission to the Minnesota bar-good moral character. 1 The pri-
mary purpose of the character requirement is the protection of a lawyer's
clients. " Although the good-moral-character requirement typically has
mobile to a friend for a loan of $2,500. This money was deposited in accounts that were
exempt from the trustee in bankruptcy under California law. A separate $1,600 debt was
also scheduled in the bankruptcy petition, but was reinstated prior to the bankruptcy
proceeding and subsequently was paid in full. Due to the above transactions, the sole debt
discharged by bankruptcy was the $14,000 in federally insured student loans. See id at
827-28.
8. See id at 831. The issue of whether a bar applicant who has discharged student
loans in bankruptcy should be admitted to practice law has been considered in at least one
other jurisdiction. See note 33 infra.
9. 279 N.W.2d at 832.
10. Good moral character is a prerequisite to the practice of law in every state. See
Comment, Bar Examinations." Good Moral Character, and Political Inquiry, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
471, 472. Although investigation of an applicant's good moral character generally in-
volves letters of reference and information regarding the person's background, some states
additionally require an interview. See id at 472-73.
11. Cf Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (legal profession "has long had a vital interest . . . in determining the fitness,
and above all the moral fitness, of those who are certified to be entrusted with the fate of
clients").
Protection of the public is the purpose of bar admission requirements. See, e.g., Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("the states have a compelling interest
in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to
protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to estab-
lish standards for licensing practitioners"); In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn.
1979) (term "moral character" used in professional context relates to capacity to serve
public in the practice of law); In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 490, 189 N.W.2d 176, 178 (1971)
(per curiam) ("lawyers ... must be subject to strict regulation with respect to admission
to practice and to the performance of professional services, as well as to public accounta-
bility"); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn: 468, 478, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951) ("The pro-
tection of the public, as the purpose of confining law practice to a licensed bar. . . is of
vital importance today." Professional standards are for safeguarding the public interest.);
Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) ("It is the duty of this
court so to regulate the practice of law. . . in order to protect primarily the interest of the
public .... "); cf. In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Minn. 1978) ("[T]he state can
regulate admission as long as such regulation is reasonably related to its interest in a com-
petent bar."), appeal dtmissed, 441 U.S. 938 (1979); In re Estate of Peterson, 230 Minn. 478,
486, 42 N.W.2d 59, 64 (1950) (statute prohibiting will drafting by unlicensed practioner
"penalizes a certain act by members of one class for the protection of the members of
another class").
It has also been suggested, however, that close scrutiny of bar applicants through
tougher bar entry requirements is a way of reducing or limiting the number of lawyers
entering the practice of law. See Today's Law School Graduates Better Trained, but There Are Too
1980]
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been defined in terms of honesty, veracity, and the absence of conduct
manifesting moral turpitude,12 the Gahan court questioned the appli-
cant's character in the context of his personal financial integrity. The
Minnesota court was concerned solely with the applicant's handling of
personal finances. No allegations of professional financial misconduct
were made. The court reasoned, however, that the applicant's disregard
of the repayment responsibility on federally insured student loans was an
indication of his lack of commitment to the rights of other students' 3 and
creditors.14 This irresponsibility, in turn, was seen as reflecting adversely
on the applicant's fitness for the practice of law.15 Because the good-
Many, 64 A.B.A.J. 192, 193 (1978). In a random telephone poll of 602 American Bar
Association members, conducted by Cambridge Opinion Studies Division of Quayle, Ples-
ser, & Co. during the last week of August, 1977, three general solutions were offered as a
means of reducing or limiting the number of lawyers entering the practice-raise law
school admission standards, impose tougher bar entry requirements, and leave entrance
into the profession to supply and demahd. A small percentage of the individuals polled
suggested that the moral character standards for entry into law schools be raised in order
to limit the number of attorneys. See id
12. The California Supreme Court has defined "good moral character" in terms of an
absence of proven conduct or acts that historically have been considered as manifestations
of moral turpitude. See Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452, 421
P.2d 76, 81, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1966). The California court defined "moral turpi-
tude" as "everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals" and as
"an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary, to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man." Id. at 452 n.4, 421 P.2d at 81 n.4, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 233 n.4.
Indiana has defined the term as including, but not limited to, "the qualities of hon-
esty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibility, and of the
laws of this state and of the United States, and a respect for the rights of other persons and
things, and the judical process." IND. R. FOR ADMISSION TO BAR & DIScIPLINE OF AT-
TORNEYS 13(IV)(A). In an early Wisconsin decision, the court stated that the words
"good moral character" are general in application but include all elements essential to
make up such character, among these being "common honesty and veracity, especially in
all professional intercourse." In re 0--, 73 Wis. 602, 618, 42 N.W. 221, 225 (1889).
13. A lack of commitment to the rights of other students was demonstrated by the
applicant's failure to repay his student loans because "repayment provides stability to the
student loan program and guarantees the continuance of the program for future student
needs." 279 N.W.2d at 831.
14. Id In response to a question of the Board of Law Examiners as to whether there
was any moral or social obligation or responsibility with regard to repayment of the loans,
the applicant answered, "I guess if I felt that there was a moral obligation to repay them, I
would have repaid them." Brief of the Minnesota State Board of Law Examiners at 4.
15. See 279 N.W.2d at 832. The Minnesota bar admission rules state the general
requirements for admission to the bar:
No person shall be admitted to practice law who has not established to the
satisfaction of the State Board of Law Examiners:
(1) That he is at least 18 years of age;
(2) That he is a person of good moral character;*
(3) That he is a resident of this state; or maintains an office in this state; or
(Vol. 6
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moral-character requirement is a subjective standard, it is susceptible to
several types of constitutional attack.
The Gahan court addressed the possible constitutional conflict between
the court's exercise of control over admission to legal practice in Minne-
sota and the free operation of federal bankruptcy law16 within limits im-
posed by the supremacy clause.17 The supremacy clause provides that
the Constitution of the United States, together with federal laws enacted
pursuant to the Constitution, are the supreme law of the land and that
conflicting state laws must yield to the supremacy of federal law.18 Be-
cause one of the primary purposes of bankruptcy law is to give an indi-
vidual a "fresh start" in life free from the oppressive weight of financial
indebtedness,' 9 the court examined the supremacy clause question of
has designated the Clerk of the Supreme Court as his agent for the
service of process for all purposes;
(4) That he has graduated from an approved law school; * *
(5) That he has passed a written examination.
* Character traits that are relevant to a determination of good moral char-
acter must have a rational connection with the applicant's present fitness or ca-
pacity to practice law, and accordingly must relate to the State's legitimate
interest in protecting prospective clients and the system of justice.
* * An approved law school is a law school that is provisionally or fully
approved by the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the
American Bar Association.
MINN. R. ADMISSION TO THE BAR II.
16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549
reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS; see 279 N.W.2d at 828. The bankruptcy
law states in part:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a li-
cense, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant
to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, termi-
nate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a
person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Act ....
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 101, 92 Star. 2549, 2593 (to
be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 525), reprnthed in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2; see 279 N.W.2d at 828-29.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2; cf, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
650 & n.13 (1977) (persons charged with crimes on federal enclaves cannot demand appli-
cation of more lenient state law because such a rule would be inconsistent with supremacy
clause); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927) (because of supremacy clause, state has
no power.to prohibit imposition of federal inheritance tax); Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631,
633-35 (1883) (reversing judgment of Illinois Supreme Court that denied stay of proceed-
ings to which defendant was entitled under federal Bankrupt Act because of supremacy of
federal law); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435 (1819) (because of
supremacy clause, state cannot impede operation of laws enacted by Congress to execute
general governmental powers). -
19. See, e.g., Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (per curiam) (basic purpose of
bankruptcy law is "to give the debtor a 'new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt' ") (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). Additional purposes of the federal
bankruptcy law include bringing about an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate,
1980)
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whether its ruling would have the practical effect of hindering applicants
adjudged bankrupt from making a "fresh start." While prevented from
pursuing a legal career in Minnesota, the applicant was not barred from
practicing his profession in the states where he had been admitted to
practice. 2
0
At one time, an express articulation of policy not in conflict with fed-
eral bankruptcy law would save a statute from a supremacy clause at-
tack.2 1 This position was overruled by the United States Supreme Court
in Perez v. Campbe//.2 2 When determining the validity of a state law, the
see, e.g., Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930), and rehabilitating the
debtor to be motivated to lead a full and productive economic life. See, e.g., Bostwick v.
United States, 521 F.2d 741, 746 (8th Cir. 1975).
20. The applicant already had been admitted to practice law in California and Wis-
consin at the time he applied'for admission to the Minnesota bar. See 279 N.W.2d at 827.
21. See, e.g., Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1962) (motor
vehicle law that prohibited restoration of bankrupt's driver's license because of bankrupt's
failure to satisfy personal injury judgment held constitutional under supremacy clause),
overruled in part in two separate cases, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965)
(other grounds), Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (by implication); Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 42 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he bankrupt was deprived of
his license by reason of a statute which conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act [and] we should
strike down the [statute] .... "), overruled, Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971).
22. 420 U.S. 637 (1971) (motor vehicle law that denied a driver's license because of
unpaid judgment, even though judgment was discharged in bankruptcy, conflicts with
bankruptcy law and violates supremacy clause).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 effectively codifies the result of Perez. Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2593 (to be
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 525), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS; S. REP.
No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, repnnted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5867. According to the legislative history found in the report of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary:
The prohibition extends only to discrimination or other action based solely on
the basis of the bankruptcy, on the basis of insolvency before or during bank-
ruptcy prior to a determination of discharge, or on the basis of nonpayment of a
debt discharged in the bankruptcy case (the Perez situation). It does not prohibit
consideration of other factors, such as future financial responsibility or ability,
and does not prohibit imposition of [other requirements], if applied nondis-
criminatorily.
Id The report also states that the new section is designed to "permit further development
to prohibit actions by governmental and quasi-governmental organizations that perform
licensing functions, such as a State bar association. . . that can seriously affect the debt-
ors' livelihood or fresh start .... ." Id Compare Marshall v. District of Columbia Gov't,
559 F.2d 726, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (although bankruptcy law gives a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort unhampered by pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt, it does not wipe out the fact of prior bankruptcy) with Handsome v.
Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.N.J. 1978) (withholding of plaintiffis tran-
scripts by state university and refusing to allow her to register because of discharge of
student loans in bankruptcy held a transgression upon "fresh start" policy of Bankruptcy
Act violating supremacy clause) and Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277,
1281 (W.D. La. 1975) (police department rule subjecting policeman to dismissal for filing
bankruptcy petition conflicts with federal law and supremacy clause).
[Vol. 6
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/5
CASE NOTES
Court now considers whether the challenged statute "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." 2 3 Thus, the Minnesota court in Gahan had to
determine whether its decision -would be consistent with the purposes
and objectives of Congress, looking both to federal bankruptcy law and
to the various educational policies and programs supporting federally in-
sured student loans.
2 4
Applying the Perez supremacy clause standard in Gahan, the court
noted that denial of the application for admission could not be based
upon the sole ground that he filed bankruptcy or refused to reinstate the
discharged debt.25 The Gahan court stated that although the fact of
bankruptcy could not be considered in determining the applicant's moral
character, the applicant's conduct before and after the bankruptcy could
be considered as evidencing his moral character concerning financial re-
sponsibilities.26 Therefore, when the court viewed the applicant's moral
character, the applicant's failure to repay his creditors was but one of
several examples of his conduct.
While acknowledging the United States Supreme Court's determina-
tion that the character requirement is a "constitutionally permissible
condition to bar admission, provided that the Constitution is not violated
in the determination of moral character," 27 the Gahan court did not spe-
cifically address possible problems arising under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The first of these problems is whether the character requirement
violates the due process doctrine of vagueness. The vagueness principle
requires that the law supply notice of what, conduct it prohibits.28 Be-
cause application of the good-moral-character requirement may prevent
23. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
24. For a discussion of the purposes of federal bankruptcy law, see note 19 supra and
accompanying text. The general purposes of federally insured student loan programs
have been stated as: "(1) to ensure a sufficient supply of well-trained, competent profes-
sional and technical personnel; and (2) to allow every person the fullest possible educa-
tional opportunity by making loans available to those who could not otherwise obtain a
loan because of their age and lack of collateral or borrowing history." Note, Student Loan
Bankruptcies, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 593, 595-96.
25. See 279 N.W.2d at 828-29.
26. See id at 829.
27. Id
28. Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee the right of every person to be
free from the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. Numerous cases support the
principle that notice is essential to due process. See, e.g., Schwartz v. First Trust Co., 236
Minn. 165, 170, 52 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1952) (adequate and proper notice is a prerequisite
of due process; "the content of the notice must be reasonably calculated to fairly apprise
the prospective claimant"); Juster Bros..v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108, 119, 7 N.W.2d 501,
508 (1943) (notice universally recognized as essential to due process); Dimke v. Finke, 209
Minn. 29, 36, 295 N.W. 75, 80 (1940) (notice is essential element of due process).
19801
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individuals from practicing their chosen profession, the vagueness doc-
trine is applicable to bar admission standards.29 The term "good moral
character" is not subject to precise definition and is of little assistance to
prospective bar applicants who wish to determine whether they meet the
moral character requirement.30 Despite the standard's lack of specificity,
however, no decision has yet held that the good-moral-character require-
ment constitutes a denial of due process. 31 . Although the term "good
moral character" has not been clearly defined in Minnesota, the Gahan
court clarified which character traits would be considered relevant to a
determination of good moral character by holding that "applicants who
flagrantly disregard the rights of others and default on serious financial
obligations, such as student loans, are lacking in good moral character if
the default is neglectful, irresponsible, and cannot be excused by a com-
pelling hardship that is reasonably beyond the control of the appli-
cant." 3 2 Circumstances that the court said might be considered as
"hardships . . . include an unusual misfortune, a catastrophe, an over-
riding financial obligation, or unavoidable unemployment."33
29. Cf Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) ("A bar composed of law-
yers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms
in order to obtain that goal."); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39
(1957) ("A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Expare Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379
(1867) ("The right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is
something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the
command of the legislature.").
30. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), the Court stated that the term
"good moral character" by itself is unusually vague and "can be defined in an almost
unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, exper-
iences, and prejudices of the definer." Id at 263. Due to the admitted vagueness of the
term, the need for clarification of the requirement has been recognized. See, e.g., In re
Hyra, 15 N.J. 252, 253, 104 A.2d 609, 609 (1954) (per curiam) ("It is important to the
applicant to know at the earliest possible date, preferably before he starts on his years of
study, whether in the judgment of the court, through its character and fitness committee,
he is lacking in character sufficiently to disqualify him for admission to the bar.").
31. See J. CLARK & C. WOLFRAM, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES FOR
MINNESOTA ATTORNEYS 64 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1976) ("the Court has
never refused to uphold a disbarment or denial of admission on grounds that these stan-
dards are too vague'). Segeneral4y In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (White, J., concurring)
("A relevant inquiry in appraising a decision to disbar is whether the attorney stricken
from the rolls can be deemed to have been on notice that the courts would condemn the
conduct for which he was removed."), qzodjifedmem on other grounds, 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
32. 279 N.W.2d at 831.
33. Id The court indicated that only Florida previously had considered the question
whether a bar applicant's failure to repay student loans demonstrates a lack of good moral
character justifying denial of admission. See id at 830.
The Florida court has dealt with this issue on two occasions. See Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); Florida Bd. of Bar Ex-
aminers re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978). In Groot the applicant was admitted to the
[Vol. 6
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The second fourteenth amendment question is whether the standard of
review used by the Gahan court to assess the applicant's good moral char-
acter violates the equal protection clause.3 4 The fourteenth amendment
requires that the specific character traits scrutinized in determining good
moral character must have a "rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice law."35 In denying the applicant admis-
sion to the Minnesota bar, the Gahan court determined that the appli-
cant's handling of his personal debt was rationally connected to his
fitness to practice law.36 Although the applicant initiated the bank-
ruptcy proceeding solely for personal reasons, the court concluded that
one's personal and professional financial and ethical spheres are not mu-
tually exclusive3 7 The failure of an applicant to satisfy normal financial
Florida bar despite his discharge of student loans in bankruptcy. See 365 So. 2d at 166-68.
Groot was the father and legal custodian of two children from his recently terminated
marriage, and unemployment forced him to prevail upon family members for loans. See
id at 168. He had suffered unusual misfortune and, at the time his bankruptcy petition
was filed, had a valid need to devote his employment income to current and not past
financial responsibilities. See id The court held that Groot's conduct under these circum-
stances was not morally reprehensible nor indicative of unfitness for admission to the bar.
See id In Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978), the court
denied bar admission to an applicant, stating:
The petitioner's admittedly legal but unjustifiably precipitous action [of execut-
ing a voluntary petition for bankiruptcy three days before law school gradua-
tion], initiated before he had obtained the results of the July bar examination,
exhausted the job market, ot given his creditors an opportunity to adjust repay-
ment schedules, indicates a lack of the moral values upon which we have a right
to insist ....
Id at 459 (footnote omitted).
The Minnesota court found the contrast between these two cases instructive for deter-
mining what circumstances surrounding a bar applicant's default in bankruptcy would be
considered justifiable. See 279 N.W.2d at 831.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution is based upon the principle that all persons shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and in liabilities imposed. See,
e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1937)
("classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' ") (quoting F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn.
286, 292, 148 N.W. 71, 74 (1914) ("A classification for purposes of legislation, to be valid,
,must be based upon some reason of public policy, growing out of the condition or business
of the class to which the legislation is limited.' ").
35. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S...232, 239 (1957); ef note 15 suipra
(same requirement in Minpesota bar admission rules).
36. See 279 N.W.2d at 831. The court stated that Gahan's disregard of his repayment
responsibility on the student loans indicated a lack of moral commitment and that "[s]uch
flagrant financial irresponsibility reflects adversely on an applicant's ability to manage
financial matters and reflects adversely on his commitment to the rights of others, thereby
reflecting adversely on his fitness for the practice of law." Id
37. See id at 829 ("Gahan's conduct prior to bankruptcy surrounding his financial
responsibility and his default on the student loans may be considered to judge his moral
19801
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obligations is clearly related to the applicant's fitness to practice law.3 8
The legal profession must command respect, trust, and utmost confi-
dence from the public if it is to perform effectively.39 A strong sense of
financial obligation is a basic element of professional ethics.40 It cannot
character."). United States Supreme Court rule 5 specifies that: "It shall be requisite to
the admission of attorneys or counsellors to practice in this court, that they shall have been
such for three years past in the highest court of a State, Territory, District, Common-
wealth, or Possession, and that their prtate and professional characters shall appear to be good."
U.S. SuP. CT. R. 5(1) (emphasis added). But see In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn.
1979), in which the court drew a distinction between personal and professional moral
character in considering a reinstatement petition. The Peterson court stated: "The respon-
sibility of this court to formulate ethical principles and;standards of professional conduct
and to enforce those standards on the lawyers of this state does not give us license to make
judgments as to a lawyer's personal morality, but only with regard to that lawyer's profes-
sional moral character." Id at 925.
Attorney misconduct outside the sphere of the profession is also grounds for disbar-
ment. See, e.g., In re Heinze, 233 Minn. 391, 394, 47 N.W.2d 123, 125 (1951) (per curiam)
("attorney may be disbarred for conduct indicative of moral unfitness, whether such con-
duct be relative to the profession or otherwise"); In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 560-61, 23
N.W.2d 4, 7 (1946) (per curiam) (misconduct of attorney outside profession, if indicative
of moral unfitness for the profession, justifies disbarment); In re Waleen, 190 Minn. 13, 17,
250 N.W. 798, 800 (1933) (per curiam) (misconduct indicative of moral unfitness for pro-
fession justifies suspension of attorney, though misconduct arises out of transaction not
involving attorney-client relationship), modifiedper curiam, 196 Minn. 295, 264 N.W. 802
(1936). An inquiry as to moral character is broader in scope for a bar applicant than for
an attorney in a disbarment proceeding. See In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 75, 98 P.2d 489,
491 (1940) (per curiam) ("court may properly refuse to admit an applicant . ..upon
proof which would not justify an order of disbarment").
38. See 279 N.W.2d at 831. See generally In re Law Examination of 1926, 191 Wis. 359,
210 N.W. 710 (1926). According to the Wisconsin court:
There is no field of human activity which requires a fuller realization with re-
spect to a fiduciary relationship than that which exists between the lawyer and
his client. Therefore, the law requires of a candidate for admission to the bar not
only knowledge and intelligence, but also a high moral character for honesty and
integrity, and without honesty and integrity the primary purpose of an attorney
at law, by which he is charged to aid in the administration of justice, is liable to
be frustrated. It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplic-
ity of circumstances that arise in the practice of the profession. For these reasons
the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the Board of Law Ex-
aminers as an arm of the court is required to cause a minute examination to be
made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice.
Id at 362-63, 210 N.W. at 711.
39. See Underwood, Character and Fitness in a 1970 Context, 39 B. EXAMINER 128, 132-
33 (1970).
40. The need for attorneys to possess a high regard for their financial responsibilities
cannot be stressed enough in view of the fact that a great number of disciplinary proceed-
ings center on attorney mishandling of clients' money. See, e.g., In re Hanson, 258 Minn.
231, 232, 103 N.W.2d 863,863 (1960) (per curiam) ("It is a ground for disbarment that an
attorney manifest professional irresponsibility by the mishandling of a client's financial
affairs,. . . or that he show a lack of absolute integrity in the handling of client's funds
.. ") (footnotes omitted); In re Solem, 188 Minn. 572, 574, 248 N.W. 212, 212 (1933)
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be assumed with any certainty that an attorney will take greater care
and responsibility with the affairs of clients than with the attorney's own
business. For this reason, the approach taken by the Gahan court in re-
quiring strict moral character standards to be met for admission to the
Minnesota bar appears to be rationally related to the protection of future
clients from an attorney's poor judgment.
The interrelationship of federal bankruptcy law, the federally insured
student loan program, and Minnesota's judicially-controlled bar admis-
sion requirements had not been addressed prior to Gahan. It is unlikely
that the Minnesota court will again face the identical question because of
a recent federal bankruptcy law amendment that prohibits the discharge
of educational loans during the first five years of the repayment period,
except in circumstances of undue hardship.41 While prospective bar ap-
plicants will read Gahan with interest, its potential for instruction and
guidance in defining the term "good moral character" is mitigated by
(per curiam) (attorney who uses client's money and fails to pay it to client can be disci-
plined); Southworth v. Bearnes, 88 Minn. 31, 34, 92 N.W. 466, 467 (1902) (per curiam)
(attorney should be disbarred for misappropriation of client's money, "for in no other way
can [the public] be protected from pecuniary losses at the hands of dishonest lawyers who
prey upon their clients").
41. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat.
2549, 2591 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS.
It should be noted that the applicant filed his petition in bankruptcy on September
27, 1977, see 279 N.W.2d at 827, three days before a congressional amendment took effect
that limited the discharge in bankruptcy of certain guaranteed student loans. See Educa-
tional Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. I, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (re-
pealed 1978). The educational amendment became effective on October 1, 1976, with
respect to any proceeding initiated under the bankruptcy code on or after September 30,
1977, and applied to loans granted under the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1071 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). See Educational Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482,
tit. I, § 127, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141-42 (repealed 1978). The amendment provided:
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part
may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only if
such a discharge is granted after the five-year period (exclusive of any applicable
suspension of the repayment period) beginning on the date of commencement of
the repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the expiration of that
five-year period, such loan may be released only if the court. . . determines that
payment from future income or other wealth will impose an undue hardship on
the debtor or his dependents.
Id § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2141. This amendment was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. III, § 317, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678, reprznted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. The 1978 Act established a broader provision in the bank-
ruptcy code. See id, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2591 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
* The new bankruptcy law covers loans granted under the National Defense Education Act
of 1958, 20 U.S.C. § 421 (1976), and the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1071
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978). Since the applicant's bankruptcy petition did not reveal the spe-
cific program under which his loans were guaranteed, it is unclear what portion, if any,
would have been non-dischargeable had he filed his petition in bankruptcy three days
later.
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the inherent ambiguity and fluidity of the phrase as a bar admission
term of art. Although Gahan's actions were morally reprehensible, they
were legally correct. Therefore, the Gahan court appears to have ac-
cepted the argument of the Board of Law Examiners that "there is little
question what may be disposed of legally may not be disposed of mor-
ally." 4
2
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose
of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to guard the ad-
ministration of justice and to protect the general public. 43 In light of the
fact that a great number of disbarment proceedings have centered on
attorney mishandling of clients' money,44 the court's decision in Gahan
appears to be a necessary step towards effectuating its duty to protect a
lawyer's clients. Since the moral character requirement does not restrict
inquiry to an individual's professional reputation, it is certainly more re-
alistic to survey an individual's entire background in order to gain a clear
and complete picture of the applicant's character. Thus, the Gahan deci-
sion may be deemed preventive medicine that protects would-be clients
from the possibility of the applicant indulging in future irresponsible
conduct.
4 5
42. Brief of the Minnesota State Board of Law Examiners at 11. The Board of Law
Examiners also stated that:
[Tihe procuring of a discharge of the student loan indebtedness (and no other)
with so little effort to repay or extend the same and with only temporary loss of
employment, no exceptional financial or health problems and no major misfor-
tunes, while neither illegal nor constituting action invincing [sic] moral turpi-
tude, nevertheless was conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have
substantial doubt concerning applicant's honesty, fairness and respect for the
rights of others and for the laws of this state and nation amounting thereby to a
lack of good moral character.
Id at 13.
43. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam); In re
Strand, 259 Minn. 379, 380, 107 N.W.2d 518, 519 (1961); In re Hanson, 258 Minn. 231,
233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960) (per curiam).
44. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
45. See 279 N.W.2d at 831.
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